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Abstract
High frequency trading (HFT) has grown substantially in recent years, due to fast-paced technological
developments and their rapid uptake, particularly in equity markets. This paper investigates how HFT
could evolve and, by developing a robust understanding of its e¤ects, to identify potential risks and
opportunities that it could present in terms of nancial stability and other market outcomes such as
volatility, liquidity, price e¢ ciency and price discovery. Despite commonly held negative perceptions, the
available evidence indicates that HFT and algorithmic trading (AT) may have several benecial e¤ects on
markets. However, they may cause instabilities in nancial markets in specic circumstances. Carefully
chosen regulatory measures are needed to address concerns in the shorter term. However, further work is
needed to inform policies in the longer term, particularly in view of likely uncertainties and lack of data.
This will be vital to support evidence-based regulation in this controversial and rapidly evolving eld.
1 Introduction
Are computerized trading systems delivering good outcomes for investors, speculators, hedgers, and other
market participants? Computer-based trading including Algorithmic Trading (AT) and High Frequency
Trading (HFT) are the predominant feature in current nancial markets due to technological advances and
market structure developments. HFT is thought to be responsible for as much as 75 percent of trading
volume in the United States in 2009 (see Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and Biais and Woolley
(2011)). Computers allow one to automate any trading strategy, and therefore to do it faster, to engage in
much more complicated versions of strategies that already existed, and in some cases to do things that were
simply not feasible before. They do what they are told to do and they dont complain about their bonus.
They have clearly improved many back o¢ ce functions. In the late 1960s the NYSE experienced an increase
in trading that lead to a mountain of paperwork related to the clearing and settlement process; this crisis
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lead to the closing of the entire stock market on Wednesdays and reduced trading hours on other days in the
week to allow sta¤ to clear their desks. The level of trading volume then was less than 1% of what it is now,
but computer technology is generally able to process all the current information ows in a timely fashion
and with high accuracy. Many authors have argued that bid ask spreads and the cost of transacting has
decreased to both retail investors and institutional investors in the last thirty years, see Jones (2013) and
OHara (2015). These sound like improvements that we should celebrate. But there is also a dark side. The
impact of HFT on market functioning has garnered increasing scrutiny, with particular impetus stemming
from events such as the May 6, 2010 Flash Crash and the October 15, 2014 bond market ash event. In the
former event, nearly a trillion US dollars temporarily evaporated in a matter of minutes. In the latter event,
the market for US Treasuries (the bedrock instrument of international nance) had it fourth-largest trading
day in history with most volatility concentrated in a half-hour period, with no apparent macroeconomic
catalyst.
It is therefore a central issue to better understand the economic role of HFTs and their impact on
market functioning, which is our purpose. The title of our paper suggests a one way causality from HFT
to security markets whereas it is more accurate to think of them as evolving together. The existence,
viability, innovation, and development of HFT depends intimately on the market structure and technology.
We survey the academic, industry, and government literature on computer-based trading and evaluate the
evidence on the functioning of nancial markets. In Section 2 we discuss the nature of HFT and AT. In
Section 3 we present some critiques of HFT, while in Section 4 we discuss the role of speed and information
in understanding the role of HFT and AT in nancial markets, and in Section 5 we discuss the issue of
protability. In Section 6 we discuss the empirical evidence about the e¤ects of HFT on market quality in
normal times and in extreme times. In Section 7 we discuss the issue of market manipulation. In Section 8
we discuss the role of big data in HFT and AT. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Ontology of HFT and AT
In this section we try to make precise what is meant by HFT and AT. The SEC Concept Release of 2010
(SEC (2010)) dened HFT thus: (1) Professional traders acting in a proprietary capacity that generate a
large number of trades on a daily basis; (2) Use of extraordinarily high speed and sophisticated programs for
generating, routing, and executing orders; (3) Use of co-location services and individual data feeds o¤ered by
exchanges and others to minimize network and other latencies; (4) Very short time-frames for establishing
and liquidating positions; (5) Submission of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission; (6)
Ending the trading day in as close to a at position as possible (that is, not carrying signicant, unhedged
positions overnight). This denition was the result of many man hours of committee work by top experts,
which has been replicated by other regulatory authorities around the world with similar results, see Foresight
(2012). It emphasizes the high degree of technological sophistication and short time frames. In principle
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AT includes HFT, but in practice what is often meant by the term AT when in juxtaposition with the term
HFT is the part of AT that is not HFT or rather the application of computer technology for the purpose of
establishing a longer term position in the underlying securities.
According to Jobs (2016), the top fteen HFT rms worldwide in 2016 were, in order: KCG, Sun
Trading, Jump Trading, Tower Research Capital, Tradebot Systems, Virtu, XR Trading, DRW Trading,
GSA Capital Partners, Maven Securities, Two Sigma International, Allston Trading, IMC, Hudson River
Trading, and Spot Trading. We could add Susquehanna and Citadel to this list of major rms; many
banks have electronic trading desks that act similarly. This list includes regulated and even stock market
listed rms (which are therefore subject to substantial regulatory oversight) with hundreds of employees. In
addition to these major rms there are many smaller rms with not such well established online presences
that might satisfy some or all of the SEC criteria. There is quite a bit of variation in speed within the
category of traders who might call themselves HFT. Some for example pay for co-location, while others do
not. Clearly, some of the larger rms are not purely acting in a proprietary capacity.
Perhaps a useful categorization can be based on the di¤erent strategies that HFT rms pursue. These
include: Market making; Cross venue/cross asset arbitrage; News based trading; Short term directional trad-
ing. These strategies have always existed in nancial markets, but regulation and technology have a¤ected
how these strategies are currently executed. We discuss next these trading strategies.
Market making. A "market maker" is a rm that stands ready to buy and sell a particular stock on
a regular and continuous basis at a publicly quoted price (According to the SEC). They make prots by
capturing the spread between a buy order and a sell order, and the di¢ culty they face is that buy and sell
orders may not arrive at the same time or at the same rate. In the past, such market makers may have
had a monopolistic position, knowing the order ow for their particular stock or stocks in advance of others
and having little direct competition. Nowadays this monopolistic structure has long gone. Nevertheless,
exchanges like to advertise their "Market Maker" structure. On the NYSE, there are Designated Market
Makers who: "Have obligations to maintain a fair and orderly market in their stocks, quote at the National
Best Bid and O¤er (NBBO) price a specied percentage of the time, and facilitate price discovery throughout
the day as well as at the open, close and in periods of signicant imbalances and high volatility"; and
Supplemental liquidity providers who have to commit to quoting a minimum quantity at the NBBO on each
side of the market to meet incoming market orders in each assigned security for a certain percentage of the
trading day. In return these rms may get some advantages in terms of fees and rebates or exemption from
short sale restrictions, or even direct payments from exchanges or issuers, but they do not have exclusive
or even necessarily superior access to the order ow information. Typically, these are large technologically
savvy rms who may participate in these arrangements for thousands of securities. In addition, there may be
many participants who do not formally take part in such exchange programs for a specic security, but quote
on both sides of the market in a similar way to o¢ cial market makers, although they have the exibility of
not being required to always be in that particular market.
3
Unlike their textbook alter ego, current market makers use both active and passive orders types, i.e., they
are alternately supplying and demanding liquidity, in order to control their inventory and risk. They need
to be able to update their quotes rapidly, and across all the securities they are active in. New information
about one stock suggests quotes should be updated on that stock but also on all other correlated (in practice
all) securities. Market makers hope to capture the spread and dont want to be o¤ering stale quotes that
give away value. Before 1999, the tick size (the minimum price increment) in the US was 1/8th of a dollar,
now it is $0.01 for most stocks. This represents a big reduction in the lower bound of spreads that could
accrue to market makers. In the more competitive environment that now operates, making markets with
1cent spreads and no further advantage seems like a losing proposition. Assuming that market makers
provide some valuable service, they need to be compensated. We may compare with retail FX as provided
by Travelex at airports around the world. They typically set quotes for a whole day at a time but their
spreads are very wide, perhaps even 30% the day before an election for example, so as to compensate for
the longer resting time they operate. They rely on the impatience and risk aversion of travellers to generate
order ow and prots.
Arbitrage Activities. One popular arbitrage is between the Emini futures contract traded on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME) in Chicago and the S&P500 index ETF (SPDR) traded on the NYSE in New
York, Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015). Index arbitrage exploits index tracker funds that are bound to
buy and sell large volumes of securities in proportion to their changing weights in indices. If a HFT rm is
able to access and process information that predicts these changes before the tracker funds do so, they can
buy up securities in advance of the trackers and sell them on to them at a prot. In the FX markets, the
triangular arbitrage between currencies is popular, for example: buy Yen with Dollars, sell Yen for Euros,
and sell Euros for Dollars. If the quoted currency values are out of line, this strategy can generate prots,
see Chaboud et al. (2014) and Mahmoodzadeh, Tseng, and Gencay (2017).
News-based trading. Company news in electronic text format is available from many sources including
commercial providers like Bloomberg, public news websites, and Twitter feeds. Automated systems can
identify company names, keywords and sometimes semantics in online text, which can be used to trade
news or sentiment before human traders can process it. Automated systems can also rapidly digest the
implications from scheduled stock specic and macroeconomic announcements, Jiang and Valente (2013).1
Direction-based Trading. Some rms predict short term price movements based on information embedded
in market data, such as quotes, transaction prices, and volumes, as well as other sources. By buying when
they predict prices will rise and then selling when they predict prices will fall, they hope to make prots
from short term movements. Momentum and contrarian strategies have been operated by many investment
funds over di¤erent frequencies for a long time with mixed success, Khandani and Lo (2007).
To summarize, HFT is fast trading with a short term horizon, which is achieved through advanced
1Although perhaps interpreting the subtleties of interpreting central bankers press conferences are beyond the current ambit
of machine learning techniques.
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technology.
3 Some Critiques of High Frequency Trading
In this section we discuss some often repeated criticisms of HFT from di¤erent quarters. There have been
a number of criticisms of HFT by industry participants. The following list was taken from a survey of the
"buy-side" conducted by Oliver Wyman [2012]:
1. The liquidity they supply is ephemeral. Current bid ask spreads are narrow, but this is an illusion
created by ickering quotes, i.e., the liquidity is not accessible to humans or slower traders. The high
volume of trading we see reects "pass the parcel trading" between HFT (intermediation chains)
rather than genuine risk transfer between nal users. Furthermore, their liquidity supply evaporates
rapidly during crisis times e.g., the Flash Crash.
2. There is a lot of implicit front running/back running of large institutional orders, whereby fast traders
can identify incoming large orders and move ahead of them. They are more like ticket touts who block
buy a section of the stadium before selling on to the people who actually want to go to the game.
3. There is too much messaging, i.e., order cancellations and revisions, which imposes a negative ex-
ternality on other traders. The current system requires big investments in technology (Smart Order
Routers, Co-location, Algos for order slicing) to keep up. There is an arms race for speed, Haldane
(2011).
4. The quoting and trading activities of HFT increase volatility relative to what it used to be
5. They engage in market abuse and manipulation: quote stu¢ ng, spoong, layering, smoking, etc.
Many well known economists and commentators have added their voices to the debate including Paul
Krugman (in the NY Times, 03/08/09):
Its hard to imagine a better illustration [of social uselessness] than high frequency trading.
The stock market is supposed to allocate capital to its most productive uses, for example by
helping companies with good ideas raise money. But its hard to see how traders who place
their orders one-thirtieth of a second faster than anyone else do anything to improve that social
function ... weve become a society in which the big bucks go to bad actors, a society that
lavishly rewards those that make us poorer.
Michael Lewis in his (2015) book emphasizes that HFT make money by front running others orders
inside the stock market by being well informed about incoming orders and being faster to react and prot
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from them. It is convenient to have use of a label such as HFT about which to make allegations, since if
one attacks any single rm or participant, then one would be subject to litigation.
We will discuss further below the question of speed and information that are at the heart of some of
these critiques. We then discuss protability as this bears on the potential size of the damage being done
by HFT.
4 Speed and Information
Since speed is the subject of much criticism, we review its role in nancial markets. In fact, speed has
always mattered to investors. A well known example is the legend of Nathan Mayer Rothschild proting
from news of the British/Prussian victory at Waterloo. He had news about the outcome of the battle ahead
of the British government (the fantasy version has it that he received the information by carrier pigeons,
other versions say by personal couriers). There are also two versions of how he made money. In the rst,
he just bought bonds on news of victory, while in the second version of events he "Spoofed" the market by
himself publicly selling bonds while having his agents buy them and keep on buying as the prices dropped.
In any case, he made lots of money from having the key information 24 hours before other participants. He
was the High Frequency Trader of his day.
We have benetted in the last fty years from remarkable technological improvements. In 1965 Gordon
Moore predicted that the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit would double approximately
every two years, and this prediction has been pretty accurate since then (although it has been claimed that
it will cease to operate from 2025). This development has led to a rapid increase in computing power and
speed and improved all the applications of technology. The following table illustrates the evolution of speed
in the last 20 years as measured by the "system latency" of the London Stock Exchanges matching engine.
This roughly follows Moores law, with an approximate halng of latency every two to three years. The
result of this is that the trading system itself can handle many more messages and deliver execution very
much faster than it could prior to 2000 and of course much faster than any human intermediated system as
was common prior to the 1980s. Of course traders have developed systems and approaches to take advantage
of this technological improvement, just as academics have also improved their productivity by making use
of faster computers and better software.
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System Implementation Latency210 6
SETS <2000 600000
SETS1 Nov 2001 250000
SETS2 Jan 2003 100000
SETS3 Oct 2005 55000
TradElect June 18, 2007 15000
TradElect 2 October 31, 2007 11000
TradElect 3 September 1, 2008 6000
TradElect 4 May 2, 2009 5000
TradElect 4.1 July 20, 2009 3700
TradElect 5 March 20, 2010 3000
Millenium February 14, 2011 113
Table 1. System latency of the London Stock Exchange matching engine
This shows that the trading infrastructure has become faster, which means that the costs of delivering a
given speed has declined too. HFT is a phenomenon that has arisen throughout this technological develop-
ment, while all trading related activity has speeded up. Since 2011 there has been a trend to use microwaves
to transmit data across key connections such as the one between New York City and Chicago. This is
because microwaves travelling in air su¤er a less than 1% speed reduction compared to light travelling in a
vacuum, whereas with conventional ber optics light travels over 30% slower. On the other hand microwaves
are more fragile, for example in storms, Shkilko and Sokolov (2016). As everything speeds up, the physical
distance between locations starts to matter much more. Knowing the latency delay factor is important
in determining which of two messages from di¤erent exchanges truly was issued rst. In this calculation,
random variation in latency and clock accuracy can also be a big factor. This makes perfect calculations
impossible, and guaranteeing being rst also impossible, although one may obtain a systematic advantage
by having the best technology, Kirilenko and Lamacie (2015). Academics and regulators working with post
trade data face major problems in scrutinizing markets. For this analysis one also needs to know that the
clocks on each exchange are synchronized so as to work out which message came rst, or since they are not
in fact synchronized at all, what is the precise time delay between the clocks on the exchanges.
How do we measure the benets of speed in electronic markets? Posting limit orders on the exchange
gives options to trade to other traders, since they have the right but not the obligation to execute against
you, Copeland and Galai (1983). The Black and Scholes call option price can be used to value the option.
In a standard notation, the price of the call option C in terms of the underlying price S is
C(S;X;  ; rf ; ) = S  (d+) X  e rf   (d );
2For comparison, the time for light to travel round trip from London to New York is around 37200 microseconds.
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d =
log SX +

rf  22

 
  p ;
where  is the standard normal cdf, while rf is the interest rate,  is the time to maturity, X is the strike
price, and  is volatility. A competitive limit order can be considered as "At the money", i.e., S = X;
furthermore, intraday interest rates rf are zero. Letting  ! 0; we obtain the approximation
C(S;X;  ; rf ; )
S
=
1p
2

p
 +O(3=2): (1)
This says that there is a positive albeit small value in a single order that sits for a small time (If there are
many orders, then the total value being given away can be large). Also, (1) says that the value being given
away increases with volatility measured by the parameter ; so that in times of market stress the value
per unit time increases. The posters of limit orders should be compensated for their service to the market
by for example the bid ask spread. The faster the limit order poster is at updating his quotes, the less
compensation he would require for posting them in the rst place. Note that the value in (1) scales with
the square root of time: millisecond to microsecond value shrinks by 1/30 not by 1/1000.
The classical Glosten and Milgrom (1985) microstructure model of a dealer market explains the bid ask
spread in terms of adverse selection. The dealer is uninformed, and he posts limit orders for informed and
uninformed traders who arrive randomly. In this model if the dealer can update quotes in response to new
information faster than the informed trader can act, then he will be able to set narrower spreads than if he
is slow and keeps stale quotes on the table. On the other hand, if the informed trader is faster than the
dealer, then the dealer will have to set wider spreads to protect himself. In the classical dealer market, the
dealer alone new the order ow and they alone set prices, "investors" had to take it or leave it. They earned
a prot from providing the service of immediacy. In the new system, that advantage has been eliminated,
and without some advantage the human and physical capital that would have gone to the market making
activity would nd better employ elsewhere. Speed of action and superior information about order ow
from datafeeds is the advantage that the new market makers seek, Menkveld (2013).
The classic inventory models, e.g., Ho and Stoll (1981,1983), explain the spread as the cost of providing
immediacy to impatient investors. In their models, the spread varies positively with the degree of the
monopoly power of the dealer, the volatility of the asset price, the trade size, and the horizon of the dealer.
This class of models predicts that competition between dealers would lead to small spreads. It also predicts
that small sized orders would require small spreads whereas larger orders would face wider spreads, ceteris
paribus. Also, if the dealer has a short horizon, then spreads should be narrow. All these suggest that
dealers who can quote and cancel faster will benet the market. Aït-Sahalia and Saglam (2013) extend this
literature to analyze the consequences for liquidity provision of competing market makers operating at high
frequency. They nd that competition increases overall liquidity and deters the fast market makers use of
order ow signals. They show that the market maker provides more liquidity as he gets faster but shies
away as volatility increases.
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There has been a lot of recent work extending microstructure models to give a special role to High
Frequency traders. In some cases, their presence delivers positive outcomes, while in others they do damage
to market quality metrics: Jarrow and Protter (2011), Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015), Pagnotta and
Philippon (2015), Cartea and Penalva (2011), Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011), Aït-Sahalia and Saglam
(2013), and Foucault, Khozan and Tham (2016). These new models allow HFT to a¤ect the functioning
of the trading system by: Being better informed agents (i.e., subscribing to news feeds) (+); Being faster
acting but uninformed (-); Preying on large informed traders (-); Preying on large uninformed traders (+);
Run games in context of multiple markets (-); Use mixed strategy over prices leads to endogenous quote
ickering (-);
These are all "could happens"; there is no dominant agreed-on model yet. By their nature, economic
models have to be simplications, and in this setting the type of simplications that must be made are
somewhat extreme and fragile in the sense that small changes in modelling assumptions can predict quite
di¤erent outcomes. Many models have no explicit time scale (for example there are two or three periods, or
the evolution of time is discrete and exogenous), when time is the key and often endogenous feature here.
The interpretation of some models is not unique, since they present some traders with an advantage that
could represent speed or just being smarter.3 Models often involve a simplied strategy space for traders
that capture some "key" feature of interest. A common feature of many models is that traders are either
informed or uninformed (about the true value of the security) and in many cases this is the key feature
that di¤erentiates participants. This is quite a drastic simplication, and it is not clear that it is justied
as the main driver of outcomes. In FX markets for example, where there are no retail traders, it is not so
clear whether this binary classication is useful. Kirilenko, Samadi, Kyle, and Tuzun (2017) record more
than 15,000 trading accounts for the Emini futures contract around the time of the Flash Crash. For their
empirical analysis they collapse these traders into around ten broad categories based on their observed
"trading styles" (in terms of their attitude to inventory and holding periods) over the four days including
the ash crash. In practice, the "HFT" category is consistent with a number of di¤erent trading strategies
such as market making, arbitrage, and short term directional trading, which can have quite di¤erent e¤ects
on markets.
5 Protability
One key question is whether HFT activity is a signicant and pernicious factor in the market as a whole.
The TABB Group (2012) estimated that the HFT sector earned $20billion prots in 2008, which raised some
concerns about their trading practices, see also Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015). Although HFT makes
a small prot per trade on average, since they make many trades they may extract a large amount of rent
from the intermediation sector, which would negatively impact end users. Kearns, Kulesza, and Nevmyvaka
3Perhaps we should be worrying about High Intelligence Traders, especially in the era of Articial Intelligence.
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(2012) investigated the potential protability of HFT. They argued that the negative consequences of HFT
seem primarily to come from their use of aggressive market orders. They used the so-called Omniscient
Trader Methodology to try to estimate an upper bound on the potential prots being made by HFT through
this strategy. They reconstructed the entire limit order book of Nasdaq in 2008 for 19 big names (this was
a major computational undertaking). The omniscient trader who can see the entire evolution of the market
uses market orders with variable direction and quantity and holds for time period 2 f0:01; : : : ; 10g. The
calculation is repeated every 10 milliseconds. They extrapolate to the entire equity universe by regression
methodology. They nd that the potential prots achievable for this strategy are quite small, quite a bit
less than $2billion per year over the equity space for this strategy. Others have argued that competition
has further reduced prots in this space. Chordia, Green and Kottimukkalur (2016) argue that HFT prots
based on trading quickly after macroeconomic announcements has declined in recent years consistent with
more competition between HFT or Low Latency Traders (LLT) as they call them.
In fact, one can obtain further information on the actual prots earned by HFT. For example, KCG and
Virtu are both regulated and listed on the NYSE and have to le regular accounts. Their stock prices does
not imply extreme protability, and their annual reports further show that gross revenues and executive
compensation are also not as high as implied by the Tabb groups estimates. On the other hand, some stock
exchanges have made lots of money since 2007 (in many cases by selling data and technology) judging by
their stock prices and annual reports.
To summarize, HFT are believed by some to be the devils spawn and to be creaming o¤ huge prots
from innocent asset managers and retail investors. In fact, protability of the sector has fallen through
increased competition. There are economics arguments why HFT can cause bad outcomes for the market
as a whole and there are economic arguments why HFT can cause good outcomes. The question of their
value is ultimately an empirical one, and we turn to this next.
6 Empirical Evidence about Market Quality
In this section we review the empirical evidence about the e¤ects of HFT on the functioning of markets, i.e.,
so-called "Market Quality".
Institutional networks introduced the rst automated trading system in 1969 and in 1977 the Green
screen, which displayed quotes from the NYSE. Glosten (1994) asked whether the electronic limit order
book (ELOB) was inevitable, and by 2000 it was a substantial part of the landscape. It is commonly
assumed that the era of HFT began around about 2005, although given the di¢ culties in dening HFT this
is not so rm a dating.4
In order to determine the e¤ect of HFT on outcomes, one could compare the market outcomes before and
4According to google trends, the term High Frequency Trading became very searched on around July 2009, and continued
to increase and reached its peak in 2014..
10
after 2005. But this would surely be oversimplied, because the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2010
a¤ected many nancial and economic outcomes over the same time period and in a much bigger way than
HFT.5
Financial markets have changed in many ways to reect the technological advances and regulatory
changes. The encouragement of competition between trading venues brought about by reg NMS in the
United States and Directive concernant les services dinvestissement/MiFid in Europe lead to a more diverse
nancial ecosystem, which lead to improvements in market quality, Gresse (2011) and OHara and Ye (2011).
There are more trading venues than there were twenty years ago, and the diversity of trading venue type has
also increased. Best execution policy in the US forces some integration of the trading venues by imposing
the law of one price for a small quantity. It fosters competition so that for example NYSE cant just trade
through a better quote placed elsewhere. This integration is accomplished by smart order routing technology
that links markets together, Foucault and Menkveld (2008). There has been a substantial development of
algorithmic software to e¤ectuate a variety of trading strategies. These algorithms are given names such
as "Stealth", "Iceberg", "Dagger", "Guerrilla", "Sniper", and "Sni¤er". They are routinely bought or
rented by a range of participants along with the technology to implement them. There has also been the
development of electronic dark pools. These are alternative trading systems that are private in nature and
thus do not interact with public order ow and seek instead to provide undisplayed liquidity to large blocks
of securities. In dark pools trading takes place anonymously, prices and quantities are not displayed as in
the "lit" venues of standard exchanges, and execution prices are usually set at the midpoint of the best bid
and o¤er from some lit venue or venues. Some authors have questioned whether dark pools degrade the
overall market quality by impeding price discovery, Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2015). More recently,
there has been concern as to whether the transaction prices achieved in dark pools are accurately pegged to
current best quoted prices, Aquilina, Diaz-Rainey, Ibikunle, and Sun (2017).
There have been many other changes in markets before and after 2005. The decimalization process
in the US markets which saw the tick size reduce from 12.5 cents to 1 cent for large stocks around 2000
is a signicant factor in the decline of bid ask spreads, since in the old regime, no matter how much
competition there was the spread could not go below 12.5 cents, Bessembinder (2003) and Aït-Sahalia and Yu
(2009).6 The demutualization process of the exchanges themselves who are now listed companies rather than
owned by their users has lead to them aggressively pursuing pricing strategies to encourage trading on their
marketplace, Malinova and Park (2011), and to improve their technology. The introduction of competition
between exchanges in Europe in 2007 after MiFID and the intensication of competition between exchanges
in the USA following the introduction of reg NMS is potentially a factor in explaining the improvement in
5 If HFT has a role to play in the large swings in market conditions, it is relatively small and insignicant in comparison with
the huge negative e¤ects of the banking and sovereign debt crises that happened during the nancial crisis.
6 In the EBS FX market after 2011, the tick size was reduced by a factor of 10 from 0.0001 (pips) to 0.00001 (decimal pips).
In Bitcoin, the minimum price increment is 10 8:
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market quality metrics, Storkenmaier and Wagener (2011).7 The growth of the economies and stock markets
of Brazil, Russia, India, and China on the other hand has lead to more sensitivity of prices to news from
around the world.
6.1 Measurement of HFT and Market Quality
We have discussed already the di¢ culty in dening HFT. In the empirical literature there are generally two
ways to measure HFT activities. There are proxies (like message tra¢ c) that are related to the intensity of
trading activity. Large volumes of order placements and cancellations indicate the involvement of computers
at the least. Examples using U.S. data can be found in Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) and
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011). One issue with this approach is that it can be a poor guide to
the presence or absence of HFT.
A key issue in identifying the consequences of HFT for market quality is endogeneity. That is, property
x may be both a cause of HFT activity and a consequence of HFT activity. The question is whether
HFT caused more volatility or whether volatility caused higher activity by HFT (this can be the case since
volatility o¤ers protable trading opportunities to some HFT). The econometric methods available to identify
the direction of causation or rather to control for endogeneity are as follows. In a rst approach, di¤erences
in di¤erences may be taken, that is, the di¤erence between treated and untreated outcomes before and after
the treatment are compared. This approach eliminates common time-specic and rm-specic e¤ects that
may contaminate our view of the e¤ects. However, sometimes it is di¢ cult to nd a proper control group
and to justify the parallel trends assumption, Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004). A second approach
is to use an instrumental variable; that is, a variable that is related to the input variable (for example, HFT
activity) but unrelated to the output variable (for example, market quality) except directly through the
input variable HFT. The main problem with this approach is nding credible instruments, that is, those
that are not correlate with the error term. Popular such instrument variables include latency upgrade events,
such as listed in Table 1, or using the time at which an exchange rst adopted automation.
6.2 Liquidity
Liquidity is a fundamental property of a well-functioning market, and lack of liquidity is generally at the
heart of many nancial crises and disasters. Is HFT associated with a decrease or increase in liquidity
during regular market conditions? There have been some substantial and well documented changes to some
important features of stock market trades and quotes in the last twelve years: the average size of transactions
has decreased; the number of transactions has increased; the number of quotes has increased and the number
of quotes per transaction has increased; the average holding period of stocks has decreased (although maybe
not the "11 seconds" of internet rumor), Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2011). However, these metrics
7MiFID2 will be implemented in January 2018. It will bring more trading onto electronic venues (from OTC) and impose
larger minimum size orders for dark pools, with a view to improving transparency.
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are not generally interpreted by themselves as measures of liquidity or market quality. Common ways of
measuring liquidity include bid-ask spreads, e¤ective spreads, realized spreads, depth, and weighted depth,
transaction volume, and Amihud illiquidity, see Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009).
There are a number of studies that try to identify computerised trading and its consequences on the order
book and transactions. Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) use the automation of the NYSE quote
dissemination as an implicit experiment to measure the causal e¤ect of algorithmic trading on liquidity. In
2003, the NYSE began to phase in the auto-quote system, which empowered computerised trading, initially
for six large active stocks and then slowly over the next ve months to all stocks on NYSE. They found that
this change narrowed spreads which was interpreted as increased algorithmic trading improving liquidity, and
reducing adverse selection. The evidence was strongest for large stocks. Another study by Chaboud et al.
(2014) also reports results on liquidity in the Electronic Broking Services (EBS) exchange rate market. They
found that even though some algorithmic traders appear to restrict their activity in the minute following
macroeconomic data releases, they increased their supply of liquidity over the hour following each release.
Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) investigate order book data from NASDAQ during the trading months of
October 2007 and June 2008. Looking at 500 of the largest rms, they construct a measure of HFT activity
by identifying "strategic runs" - which are linked submissions, cancellations, and executions. These are likely
to be parts of a dynamic strategy adopted by such traders. Their conclusion is that increased low-latency
activity improves traditional market quality measures such as spreads and displayed depth in the limit order
book, as well as reducing short-term volatility.
Brogaard (2010) also investigated the impact of high frequency trading on market quality in US markets.
High frequency traders were found to participate in 77% of all trades and tended to engage in a price-reversal
strategy. There was no evidence to suggest that high frequency traders were withdrawing from markets in
bad times or engaging in abnormal front-running of large non-HFT trades. High frequency traders demanded
liquidity for 50.4% of all trades and supplied liquidity for 51.4% of all trades. They also provided the best
quotes approximately 50% of the time.
Turning to Europe, Menkveld (2013) studied in some detail the entry of a new high frequency trader
into trading on Dutch stocks at Euronext and a new market Chi-X in 2007 and 2008. He shows that the
inventory of the high frequency trader ends the day close to zero but varies throughout the day, which is
consistent with the SEC denition of HFT. All the traders earnings arose from passive orders (liquidity
supply). He also found that the bid-ask spreads were reduced by about 30% within a year when compared
with Belgian stocks that were not traded by the HFT entrant. Brogaard and Garriott (2017) show similarly
improved spread metrics on the Alpha exchange in Canada post the arrival of 11 HFT rms.
There are also studies reporting trends in liquidity without specically linking them to algorithmic or
high frequency trading. Castura et al. (2010) investigated trends in bid-ask spreads on the Russell 1000 and
2000 stocks over the period 2006 to 2010. They show that bid-ask spreads have declined over this period and
that available liquidity (dened as the value available to buy and sell at the inside bid and ask) improved
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over time. Angel, Harris and Spatt (2010) show a slow decrease in the average spread for S&P500 stocks
over the period 2003-2010 (subject to some short-term up-side uctuations in 2007/2008). They also nd
that depth has increased slowly over the relevant period. The evidence also shows that both the number
of quotes per minute and the cancellation to execution ratio have increased, while market order execution
speed has increased considerably.
Friedrich and Payne (2012) compare the operation of HFT in equities and foreign exchange (FX). They
nd that penetration of algorithmic, dynamic agency ow (i.e. best execution of trades on behalf of clients)
on multilateral order books in FX is small relative to equities, perhaps because FX is more liquid and
therefore orders do not need to be broken up. They report no trend in volume (the traded value) of
FTSE100 stocks traded between 2006 and 2011, but nd that bid-ask spreads have decreased while depth
has increased. The number of trades, on the other hand, has increased more than ve times over this period,
implying that the average trade size is now only 20% of its former level. For small UK stocks there are
di¤erent results. First, the average trade size has not changed as much over the period 2006 to 2011, which
suggests that HFT is not so actively involved in their trading. Secondly, there has been little improvement
in the liquidity of small cap stocks.
6.3 Transaction Costs
Trading with computers is cheaper than trading with humans, so transaction costs have fallen steadily
in recent years as a result of the automation of markets. Jones (2002) reports the average relative one-
way costs paid for trading Dow Jones stocks between 1935 and 2000. He nds the total cost of trading
has fallen dramatically in the period 1975-2000. Angel, Harris and Spatt (2010) show that average retail
commissions in the USA have decreased between 2003 and 2010, a period more relevant for inferring the
e¤ects of computer trading. They also make a cross-country comparison of trading costs at the end of 2009.
According to this study, the United States large cap stocks are the cheapest to trade in the world with a
roughly 40 basis point cost. They also have the market place most impacted by technology and HFT.
Menkveld (2013) argues that new entry, often designed to accommodate HFT, had profound e¤ects on
transaction costs. For example, the entry of Chi-X into the market for Dutch index stocks had an immediate
and substantial e¤ect on trading fees for investors, rst through the lower fees that Chi-X charged and then
through the consequent reduction in fees that Euronext o¤ered. The strongest e¤ect however was a reduction
in clearing fees. A new clearing house entered, EMCF, and this triggered a price war that ended up with a
50% reduction in clearing fees. This reduction in clearing fees seems to have been replicated across European
exchanges to the benet of investors.
The interests of institutional investors are of great importance. Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt, and Ysusi
(2012) examines the direct e¤ects of HFT on the execution costs of long-term investors. The authors use
a new UK dataset obtained from the detailed transaction reports of the Financial Services Authority over
the period 2007-2011 to provide a better measurement of HFT activity. They combine this with Ancerno
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data on institutional investors trading costs. To test whether HFT has impacted the execution costs of
institutional traders, the authors conduct a series of event studies around changes in network speeds on the
London Stock Exchange to isolate sudden increases in HFT activity. This study found that the increases in
HFT activity have no measurable e¤ect on institutional execution costs. Of course additional studies linking
HFT and institutional trading costs in other market settings would be helpful in determining the generality
of this nding.
6.4 Price Discovery and E¢ ciency
The usual method of measuring the degree of market ine¢ ciency is through the predictability of prices
based on past price information alone. In practice, widely used measures such as variance ratios and
autocorrelation coe¢ cients estimate the predictability of prices based on linear rules. Hendershott (2012)
describes the meaning of price e¢ ciency in the context of high-speed markets, and presents the arguments
why HFT may improve market e¢ ciency by enabling price discovery through information dissemination.
Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) nd that high frequency traders play a positive role in price
e¢ ciency by trading in the direction of permanent price changes and in the opposite direction of transitory
pricing errors on average days and the days of highest volatility. Negative e¤ects on e¢ ciency can arise if
high frequency traders pursue market manipulation strategies, see below. However, it is clear that price
e¢ ciency-reducing strategies, such as manipulative directional strategies, are more di¢ cult to implement
e¤ectively if there are many rms following the same strategies. Thus, the more competitive the HFT
industry, the more e¢ cient will be the markets in which they work.
There is a variety of evidence suggesting that price e¢ ciency has generally improved with the growth of
computer-based trading. Castura et al. (2010) investigate trends in market e¢ ciency in Russell 1000/2000
stocks traded on NYSE and Nasdaq over the period 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2009. They compared
the variances of stock returns computed at one second, ten seconds, one minute and ten minutes. Prior to
the automation of the NYSE in 2006-2007 the NYSE had much slower trading than Nasdaq, which meant it
was less attractive to HFT. As the automation proceeded, penetration by HFT increased on NYSE. Based
on evidence from intraday variance ratios, they argue that markets became more e¢ cient in the presence
of and increasing penetration by HFT. In summary, the preponderance of evidence suggests that HFT has
not harmed, and may have improved, price e¢ ciency.
6.5 Volatility and Stability
There is a concern that some HFT systems, like other novel trading systems in the past, could be making a
steady stream of small prots but at the risk of causing very big losses if (or when) things go wrong, picking
up pennies before steamrollers, as the saying goes. Even if each individual HFT system is considered to be
stable, it is well known that groups of stable systems can, in principal, interact in highly unstable ways.
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Price volatility is a fundamental measure useful in characterizing nancial stability, since wildly volatile
prices are a possible indicator of instabilities in the market and may discourage stock market participation.
There are a number of studies that have argued that HFT increases volatility, meaning essentially that
volatility is higher in faster markets. One of the key issues that needs to be addressed in making such a
comparison is the time frame under consideration. For example, retail FX providers such as Travelex keep
their midquote constant throughout a trading day, and common measures of intraday volatility calculated
from this price would be zero, whereas the spot or futures FX market would reveal nontrivial and time
varying intraday volatility. However, day to day variability on Travelex midquotes would essentially track
the volatility on the spot market. The time frame for comparison is critical.
Many authors have argued that the introduction of computerized trading and the increased prevalence
of HFT strategies in the period post 2005 has lead to an increase in volatility, see Boehmer, Fong, and
Wu (2015), Zhang (2010), Benos and Sagade (2012), and Caivano (2015). How to test this hypothesis?
There are a number of studies that have investigated this question with natural experiments methodology,
Hendershott and Riordan (2013) and Brogaard et al (2014), but the conclusions one can draw from such
work are event specic. One implication of this hypothesis is that ceteris paribus the ratio of intraday to
overnight volatility should have increased during this period because trading is not taking place during the
market close period. Linton and Wu (2016) show that for large stocks the reverse has happened, i.e., the
ratio of overnight to intraday volatility has increased over the period 2001-2016. This nding seems to
be hard to reconcile with the view that trading has increased volatility. Hasbrouck (2016) compares the
volatility of quoted prices over the 2001-2011 period. At subsecond horizons bids and o¤ers in U.S. equity
markets are more volatile than what would be implied by long-term fundamentals. He suggests that traders
random latencies interact with quote volatility to generate execution price risk and relative latency costs and
that this volatility is more likely to arise from recurrent cycles of undercutting, rather than mixed strategies
of limit order placement. He also shows that this quote volatility does not display a strong trend despite
the high growth in quote tra¢ c. Overall, the evidence does not support the view that HFT has increased
volatility in normal times.
We now turn to the discussion of extreme events or ash crashes. Flash crashes are short and relatively
deep price movements that are not apparently driven by fundamentals or rather the movement in prices is
in excess of what would be warranted based on fundamentals, according to hindsight anyway. Unlike some
other market crashes (e.g., 1929 and 1987) one may not easily identify a prior period where the market
was dominated by bubbles. Also, in many cases they are not contagioned globally unlike say the 1929
and 1987 crashes, which were worldwide phenomena. Some argue that in certain specic circumstances,
self-reinforcing nonlinear feedback loops (the e¤ect of a small change looping back on itself and triggering a
bigger change, which again loops back and so on) within well-intentioned management and control processes
can amplify internal risks and lead to undesired interactions and outcomes, Danielsson and Shin (2013).
These feedback loops can involve risk-management systems, and can be driven by changes in market volume
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or volatility, by market news and by delays in distributing reference data. HFT has the potential to lead to
a qualitatively di¤erent and more obviously nonlinear nancial system in which crises and critical events are
more likely to occur in the rst place, even in the absence of larger or more frequent external fundamental
shocks. In the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) class of models, Flash crashes may be caused by increased
"toxic" order ow from informed agents or a misinterpretation of a large temporary directional order ow
as being permanent.
We rst consider the Flash Crash in the US stock market on May 6th, 2010. In Figure 1 we show the
trajectory of the Emini futures price in the hour containing the peak declines and rise, along with the change
in consecutive transaction prices in terms of ticks. This shows the rapidity of the price changes and the
incredible volatility that was present during the crash. Even a half hour before the crash most price changes
between consecutive transactions took place within one tick, but during the most intense period there were
price changes of upto 40 ticks in both directions.
Figure 1. Price level of the Emini near term futures contract during the ash crash along with changes in
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prices between consecutive transactions measured in ticks.
The SEC/CFTC (2010) report on the Flash Crash suggested some explanations for the initiation and
promulgation of the Flash crash. They argued that a starting point was a large parent sell order by Waddell
& Reed for 75,000 emini contracts that was divided into "price insensitive" market orders and fed into the
market at a rate proportional to the transaction volume that had occurred in the most recent period. This
lead to a dynamic interaction between di¤erent types of traders as they tried to absorb the large volume by
trading amongst themselves which in turn raised the transaction volume which led to more selling by the
Waddell & Reed algo. At some point, the loop broke and HFTs "withdrew liquidity". Kirilenko, Samadi,
Kyle, and Tuzun (2017) conclude that HFTs did not trigger the Flash Crash, but their responses to the
unusually large selling pressure on that day exacerbated market volatility. Easley, Lopez de Prado, and
OHara (2011) argue that historically high levels of order toxicity forced market makers to withdraw during
the Flash Crash.8 Others have disputed some parts of this narrative, Hunsader (2010), Madhavan (2011),
Andersen and Bondarenko (2013) and Menkveld and Yueshen (2017).
Some other recent technological/market disasters include: the Facebook IPO (#Faceplant) on May 18,
2012 when trading was delayed for half an hour; the BATS IPO (the stock opened at $15.5 but traded down
to a penny in 1.4 seconds); and the Google (#Pending Larry) mistaken early earnings announcement in
2012 (price went down 10% in 8 minutes). The so-called Knightmare on Wall street on August 1, 2012:
Knight Capital was a market maker/HFT rm, listed on the NYSE. A "trading error" caused widespread
disruption on NYSE, and the rm lost $450m in a few minutes, see Nanex (2012). Subsequently, they were
bought out by another HFT. The so-called Hash Crash on April 23rd, 2013: there was a hack of Reuters
twitter account and a story tweeted about a bomb at the White house, which resulted in a rapid drop in
the Dow Jones index, and subsequent rapid recovery when the hack was uncovered. The Treasury Flash
"event" (where prices went up rapidly and yields went down equally rapidly) of October 15th, 2014, was a
very big event where it has proven di¢ cult to explain the magnitude of the short term price changes.
Foreign exchange (FX) markets have some di¤erent features from equity markets. They have a large
OTC component where the identity of the transacting parties is common knowledge (unlike in the electronic
order book where price and quantity are displayed but identity is hidden), and they are "lightly regulated".
There have been a number of recent rule changes on EBS, one of the largest electronic platforms, with a
view to limiting and mitigating the actions of anonymous HFT participants. EBS introduced a minimum
quote life (MQL) in 2009, where quotes must remain tradable for at least a minimum amount of time (e.g.
500ms) to permit most participants the opportunity to trade on them. A "latency oor" was introduced
in 2014 in which orders arriving with a period (which is itself random in length and random in start time)
are kept within one or more batches, and their priority within the batch is randomised (ParFX and Reuters
also have versions of this). Nevertheless, ash crashes have occurred in FX markets. One major event was
8Order ow is considered toxic when it adversely selects market makers who are unaware that they are providing liquidity
at their own loss.
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the Swiss Franc depegging event of 15th January, 2015 whereby the Swiss authorities removed their large
limit order on EBS that was supporting the desired price level. After a short while, this resulted in a rapid
increase in the Swiss France from 1.20 to 0.80, and a subsequent recovery to 1.05. The downward trajectory
was chaotic and there was gapping, meaning that many price points in between were not visited. Although
the primary cause of the "crash" is obvious and reecting fundamental information, the way it transpired
is worrisome.
Figure 2. Swiss franc against the euro and dollar on the day of the depegging announcement
The Sterling Flash Crash on 20161007 is a more recent example. The GBP/USD currency, the third
most liquid currency pair in the world, dropped by 9.66%, from 1.2601 to 1.1491, within 40 seconds. Most of
this movement was reversed within the ten minutes that followed. The Bank for International Settlements
provided a report, BIS (2017), on the sterling ash episode. Rather than pointing to any single driver, it
found the movement in the currency pair to have resulted from a "conuence of factors". These included
larger-than-normal trading (predominantly selling) volumes at a typically illiquid part of the trading day, as
well as demand to sell sterling to hedge options positions and execute client orders in response to the initial
fall in the exchange rate. The report also notes the potential amplifying role played by trading halts in
USD/GBP futures contracts on the CME futures exchange. This may have created larger price pressure on
other platforms and increased the price impact of trades in the spot market because many trading systems
rely on the linkage between the spot and futures markets.
Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a) propose a comprehensive model of trading in markets as transfers of risk
in business time. Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016b) apply their ndings to explain crashes of market in October
1929, October 1987, January 2008, and the ash crash of May 2010. They dene the concept of bets as a
parent sell or buy order that can be decomposed into many small trades. The bet does not have to be placed
by a single person but can be composed of multiple orders acting on the same impulse or information. An
example of this is when a price decline forces a liquidation of positions made on margin in a given security.
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The advantage of this approach is that it does not su¤er from biases caused by analyzing all the decomposed
small trades (which individually have small impact) separately. Tobek, Linton, Noss, Crowley-Reidy and
Pedace (2017) argue that the rst part of the sterling ash crash was broadly consistent with the Kyle and
Obizhaeva (2016b) impact model given the large directional order ow, but subsequent price developments
went beyond that countenanced by the impact model.
There has been an increase in the deployment of and variety of circuit breakers and other market controls
that limit price movements or halt trading on exchanges. Their purpose is to reduce the risk of a market
collapse induced by a sequence of cascading trades. Circuit breakers can take many forms. There have
been three types of circuit breakers in the U.S. equity markets: the market wide circuit breaker, the single
stock circuit breaker, and the limit up-limit down trading halt. The market wide circuit breaker shuts down
all trading, when triggered by a large movement in the stock price index. The single stock circuit breaker
shuts down trading (or switches trading to an auction mechanism) when there is a large movement in the
individual stock price. The limit up limit down mechanism prohibits trade outside upper and lower bounds,
however trade of the stock can continue within the limits. Some authors have found positive e¤ects of circuit
breakers on market quality, Brugler and Linton (2017).
Circuit breakers are no panacea. Price discovery is a natural feature of markets, and bad news can
induce (sometimes large) price drops to new e¢ cient values. Halting markets can interfere with this natural
process, and may simply postpone the inevitable. An empirically documented e¤ect of circuit breakers is
the so-called magnet or gravitational e¤ect whereby traders rush to carry out trades when a halt becomes
imminent, accelerating the price change process and forcing trading to be halted sooner or moving a price
more than it otherwise would have moved, Subrahmanyam (1994), Arak and Cook (1997). During the
sterling ash crash some have argued that the implementation of trading halts in the CME futures market
contributed to the collapse of the spot market. In January 2016 China suspended its recently implemented
circuit-breaker system after it experienced two days in close succession when trading in Chinese stocks had
been halted because of a plunge in prices. The China Securities Regulatory Commission has used the halts
and other measures to control downward pressure amid volatility. However, some observers felt the system
as designed could have increased investor jitters about the health of markets.
7 Market Manipulation
Markham (2014) describes the long history of market manipulation including squeezes, pump and dump
schemes, and insider trading in the era before and including electronic trading. The following types of
market manipulation are of particular concern in electronic markets.
Front running (pre-hedging) Traditionally, this arises when a broker who is charged with executing a
large order on behalf of a client, trades on his own account ahead of the client trades selling back or buying
back to them at worse prices (from the clients perspective). Nowadays, this refers to the practice whereby a
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trader learns about a large order through the electronic marketplace and trades ahead of that order, thereby
proting from the momentum induced by the clients trades. One way of learning about the presence of large
order is through Phishing or Pinging. This is quoting or placing orders, usually in small size, to uncover
hidden orders or intentions of other participants, and then trading to take advantage of the information
obtained; this technique is particularly e¤ective on trading platforms where order conrmations are sent
immediately, but market data updates are sent afterwards or even at regular, low sampled intervals
Quote stu¢ ng This involves placing a large number of orders and then immediately cancelling them.
The purpose of this is to make things di¢ cult for rival rms by adding lots of noise into the system that
the stu¤er knows is not real but other participants do not. There are claims that this happened during the
ash crash and at other times. This seems to be particularly an issue in the US stock market system due to
the large number of trading venues and the logic of the National Market System, which requires routing of
orders to obtain the best price wherever that is, Elder (2010). On the LSE for example, there are message
throttling schemes to prevent over messaging relative to some prior agreed quantity. Of course, in times of
market crisis when trading volumes increase massively relative average daily volume, these limits may be
relaxed by the trading venue.
Smoking/Flashing/Strobing. O¤ering attractive limit orders (better than current top-of-book) and then
quickly amending these orders to worse prices to exploit slower participantsmarket orders.
Layering and spoong. A series of visible limit orders on one side of the market (the fake side) entered
in a sequence to create the impression of increased demand/supply but far enough away form the touch
to have small execution risk (or if close to the touch, small enough in size for execution not to matter),
followed by or preceded by a limit order away from the touch on the other side (or a market order at the
right time). For the spoong to work, other participants have to improve their quotes in response to the
fake side activity, thereby creating a better price on that side, which then is hit by the spoofers other side
orders. This is then followed by cancellation of the fake side orders, and perhaps reversal of the strategy to
complete a round trip. The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits "disruptive" trading such as spoong.
The academic literature on modern market manipulations is relatively thin. There are some classic
theoretical treatments of Allen and Gorton (1992) and Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) who discussed the
economics of manipulation. There are a number of empirical studies documenting manipulation of closing
prices (banging the close), see Putnins (2012), but relatively few documenting say spoong. One exception
is Lee, Eom and Park (2013) who investigated the Korean exchange ELOB, which until the end of 2001
disclosed the best prices and the total quantity without regard to where that quantity was priced. The
authors document spoong strategies on this market: big orders placed away from the touch that conveyed
the impression of increased activity on one side of the market followed by market orders on the other side
that captured the subsequent price movement.
There have been a number of market manipulation cases in the US and UK that lead to legal action.
Navinder Sarao (the Hound of Hounslow) was convicted in February 2017 of spoong in the E-mini futures
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market including during the Flash crash day. He was trading from his parentshouse in West London through
a US brokers account. Similarly, two recent cases in the UK involved traders who spoofed stocks on the
LSE using a combination of algorithmic execution and manual intervention and were relatively small and
technologically mediocre players. The relative lack of HFT-related cases is consistent with the interpretation
that HFT is not giving rise to more abuse, or alternatively that such abuse is much harder to detect. It is
certainly the case that the few penalties related to HFT pale into insignicance when compared to the nes
imposed to date on the rms implicated in the low frequency LIBOR xing scandal uncovered in 2012, and
the FX xing scandal in 2014. There is some evidence (Aitken et al. (2012)) that closing price manipulation
has reduced due to the presence of HFT.
8 Big Data and Financial Markets
The amount of data created and consumed by humanity has increased exponentially and will continue to
do so in the near future. Recent developments in "Machine Learning" technology promises to be able to
analyze this data rapidly and accurately. The success of the computer programme AlphaGo in beating the
world Go champion in 2016 at this very complex and subtle game has demonstrated the value of machine
learning techniques. This was considered the most complex of human games, more di¢ cult for a computer
to win at than chess, which was already conquered ten years ago. In this case, the data are quite complex
in type although rather small in volume, but the strategy space over which the software has to search is
huge, as there are approximately 361!=10700 di¤erent games on a 1919 board. There are many other
successes of this new data mining methodology in medicine, marketing, and security services. A lot of the
basic techniques used in machine learning are easy to acquire and deploy and are publicly available in open
source depositaries such as GitHub.
The objective of High Frequency Trading is to make many round trip trades in as short a time as possible
with small expected prot per trade, which involves making very short term predictions. Their approach is
a bit like taking AlphaGo and requiring it to make a move every nanosecond. In that case it would make
very simple moves that would not have any educational value ex post. It would still win if the human
opponent was required to move in nanosecond frequency also or forfeit his move, but it would win ugly.
Some algorithmic traders on the other hand are trying to buy or sell a large quantity of stock and seek to do
this in a way that gets the best price within some fairly long time frame. This is an objective that may be
achieved better using more complicated techniques based on big data. There is an increase in the number
of ntech companies that provide such services. Could we ever expect big data techniques to be able to
predict nancial markets better than was possible in the past?
Economic models usually employ a dichotomy between informed individuals and uninformed individuals
and draw various conclusions from this. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) develop a model of stock prices in
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the presence of costly information acquisition. They establish that
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the squared correlation between the signal and the equilibrium price, which measures the informativeness
of the price system. This allows some comparative statics. One could argue that the cost of acquiring
basic historical data has decreased, and generally the quality and quantity of data has improved, although
given the vast quantity of data being produced, nding the relevant information from the noisy chatter
is challenging (and perhaps the cost of the most relevant and timely data has even increased). Anyway,
suppose that 2=
2
" increases and c decreases in (2). Then 
2
 should rise and the price system should
be more informative. On the other hand, one might imagine a more complex scenario in which both the
signal and the noise increase and where it is not the absolute cost of information but the relative cost of
information (cost per unit of 2) in which case the predictions are ambiguous. One thing should be clear,
that the Grossman and Stiglitz model sets limits on the amount of predictability that can be achieved in
nancial markets for any given cost/signal noise ratio. In practice, there are also many issues raised about
the sensitivity of the market system to herding induced by automated systems.
9 Conclusions
High frequency trading can improve the quality of markets, fostering greater liquidity, narrowing spreads,
and increasing e¢ ciency. Yet these benets may come with associated costs: the rates at which current
systems can interact autonomously with each other raises the risk that rare but extreme adverse events
can be initiated and then proceed at speeds very much faster than humans can comfortably cope with,
generating volumes of data that can require weeks of computer-assisted analysis by teams of skilled analysts
before they are understood. Although they may happen only very rarely, there is a clear danger that very
serious situations can develop at extreme speed. We next discuss a number of proposals to alter market
design to mitigate some of the negative outcomes associated with HFT.
Some have argued that the order priority rules which determine the sequence in which submitted orders
are executed on equity markets are at fault and prioritize speed. The policy issue is whether time-price
priority unduly rewards high frequency traders and leads to over-investment in an unproductive technology
arms race, Haldane (2011) and Baron, Brogaard, and Kirilenko (2014). The greatest benet of a time-price
priority rule is that it treats every order equally. Using other priorities, such as a pro rata rule where
every order at a price gets a partial execution, gives greater benets to large traders over small traders.
In addition, time-price priority provides a stronger incentive to improve the quote than a pro rata rule,
enhancing liquidity dynamics. Limit order providers face risks in that traders with better information can
prot at their expense. Time-price priority encourages risk-taking by giving priority in execution to limit
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order providers willing to improve their quotes. The IEX exchange was established with a view to o¤er equity
traders an alternative priority scheme, as discussed in Lewis (2015). They also claim to o¤er protection from
"crumbling quotes", i.e. to protect orders from trading during unstable, i.e., fast moving, and potentially
adverse conditions.9 They have gained some market share but are still far behind NYSE, Nasdaq, and
BATS.
Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015) have proposed to replace the continuous ELOB by periodic auctions,
which can be designed to minimize the advantage of speed and to mitigate other negative outcomes of
the continuous trading model such as manipulative strategies. The main benet of periodic call auctions
would be a reduction of the speed of trading and the elimination of the arms race for speed discussed
above. The speed of trading could be controlled through the timing and frequency parameters, which could
be tuned to individual and market conditions. One issue with this proposal is how to foster competition
and allow dynamic hedging, which requires synchronization between securities on the same and competing
venues. Many markets have auctions at the open and the close and now are introducing midday auctions,
in addition to the continuous trading segment. The auction mechanism was the primary mechanism for
stock trading in many markets before the ELOB arrived, and there are a number of studies documenting
the benets of adding the ELOB from this period, Amihud, Mendelsohn, and Lauterbach (1997).
The worldsnancial markets are engines of economic growth, enabling corporations to raise funds and
o¤ering investors the opportunity to achieve their preferred balance of expected risks and rewards. It is
important that they remain fair and orderly. Deciding how best to ensure this, in light of the huge growth
in both the uptake and complexity of high frequency trading that has occurred in the last decade, and which
can be expected to continue in the next, requires careful thought and discussion.
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